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This paper offers a micro-founded general definition of poverty set in the context of 
utility theory. Poverty and non-poverty are described as two structurally different types of 
local non-satiation: the former entails a strong need for further consumption and social 
marginalization, the latter is characterized by a weak need for further consumption and 
satisfactory adjustment to social expectations. Each of the states can be fully described by a 
separate technology of utility production. The model is tested on data from the Bank of 
Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth; an indicator of self-reported economic 
satisfaction is regressed on yearly consumption of food and non-food commodities. The 
predictions of the model are confirmed in the case of food consumption, signalling the 
existence of physiological minima that are uniformly perceived by individuals. For non-food 
commodities, no significant change of regimes is found: welfare appears to be connected 
with needs that are less exposed to structural variation, possibly because they are not as 
urgent or objective as food-related ones.  
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1 I would like to thank Tony Atkinson, Andrea Brandolini, Giovanni D’Alessio, Giacomo Ponzetto, Inger Munk, Ivan 
Faiella, Luigi Federico Signorini, Marco Taboga and three anonymous referees for useful suggestions. All remaining 
mistakes are mine. This paper reflects only the author’s opinions, which should not be attributed to the Bank of Italy. 
A number of definitions have been proposed in the literature for the state of being 
commonly known as poverty. Is it simply a failure to achieve a certain level of income in a 
given    time  span,  or  is  it  a  broader  condition  arising  from  the  concurrence  of  low 
consumption, lack of education, bad health and precarious employment (Ravallion, 1994; 
World Bank, 2000)? Does deprivation correspond to falling short of a minimum level of 
daily calorie intake, or does it mean being unable to afford what most of the neighbours have 
(Townsend,  1962;  Townsend,  1979;  Sen,  1983;  Mack  and  Lansley,  1985)?  Does  an 
objective condition of poverty even exist at all, or is it in the eye of the beholder (Garner and 
de Vos, 1995; Lelkes, 2006; D’Ambrosio and Frick, 2004)? 
Each interpretation spawns its own toolbox: a set of poverty lines, i. e. thresholds 
separating the poor from the non-poor, and an array of poverty indicators. In recent times, 
the debate has concentrated on how to choose the best among these toolboxes and on the 
qualities that a good poverty index should have (Ravallion, 1996; Glennerster, 2000; Förster, 
Tarcali and Till, 2002; Garcia Diaz, 2003; Atkinson, Marlier and Nolan, 2004). This turn 
towards the existential rather than the ontological might have been driven by the fact that the 
study  of  poverty  is  very  close  to  policy-making:  the  task  of  identifying  the  destitute 
primarily  serves  the  purpose  of  outlining  a  target  population  for  relief  programme.  The 
question of the very nature of poverty has thus been largely overlooked, or tackled indirectly 
by  assuming  that  a  particular  reading  of  the  concept  is  correct  and  then  building  a 
measurement strategy upon it.    
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This paper brings the focus back onto what poverty itself is. It offers a micro-founded 
general definition set in the context of utility theory. We define poverty and non-poverty as 
two qualitatively different types of local non-satiation: the former entails a strong need for 
further consumption
2 and social marginalization, the latter is characterized by a weak need 
for further consumption and satisfactory adjustment to social expectations. Each of the states 
is fully described by a separate technology of utility production. A poverty line is a quantity 
of a good at which there is a structural break in how utility is extracted from consumption of 
that good.  
Our qualification of poverty draws on the one tenet of the literature that does not 
appear to be in discussion: there is a difference between those who cannot satisfy their basic 
needs  and  those  who  can.  It  also  incorporates  two  corollaries  of  this  statement  that  are 
widely agreed upon: first, meeting fundamental demands is more important than achieving 
further resources once those are taken care of; second, not meeting them is accompanied by 
burdens such as social stigma and diffuse feelings of powerlessness. These ideas suggest the 
existence of a dual-regime technology of utility production: each individual derives utility 
from each attribute corresponding to a dimension of life we deem relevant for well-being, 
but the function that transforms the level of the attribute owned by the individual into utility 
is differently parametrized depending on the state of poverty of the individual with respect to 
that attribute. In particular, if the poor can be defined as people who experience a special 
state of need, and if marginal utility can be taken as a proxy of the intensity of need, when a 
person  makes  the  transition  from  poor  to  non-poor  the  marginal  utility  of  consumption 
registers a discrete negative change that goes  beyond the  fall  in returns to consumption 
predicted by standard theory. This reflects a switch between two different utility-production 
regimes, also marked by the elimination of the moral cost connected with rejection on the 
part of society.
 3 
                                                         
2 When poverty is studied from a multidimensional perspective, it is often emphasized how welfare depends on goods 
that technically are not “consumed”. We will use the term “consumption” throughout the paper for the sake of simplicity, 
but it should be understood to refer to enjoyment of any good that contributes to the formation of well-being. 
3 Symmetrically,  it can be argued that the non-poor reap moral rewards from being well-adjusted to social standards. In 
order to keep the formalization as simple as possible, this aspect is not discussed in the paper. We choose to consider the 
condition of those who fit in with social standards as the benchmark, and evaluate the costs of poverty differentially by 
assuming that the rewards to being non-poor only consist in leaving stigma and rejection behind, with no added bonus.    
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In  our  framework,  most  well-known  interpretations  of  poverty  turn  out  to  be 
specifications of the general definition, in the form of parametrizations of a comprehensive 
model. The theory is tested in the paper for one such specification. As an accessory, we 
present a flexible poverty indicator to match, which can also be used to carry out sensitivity 
analysis with respect to implementation choices. 
To our knowledge, at present the literature does not provide a unifying ontology of 
poverty such as the one proposed here: several of its constituent parts, however, have been 
explored.  Models  featuring  bilinear  or  other  parameter-switching  utility  functions  are 
routinely used in finance to describe structural changes in the level of risk aversion (Sharpe, 
1998). The idea of implicit levels of utility associated with poverty measures was originally 
developed in a uni-dimensional, monetary framework by Hagenaars and Van Praag (1985) 
and Hagenaars (1986), and subsequently extended by many others. The possibility of a dual 
structure of preferences  has  been  studied  in relation to poverty  by Eswaran and  Kotwal 
(1993), although they describe a variation in utility-production technologies between food 
and non-food goods rather than for each good individually. The cost of poverty in terms of 
social stigma and exclusion has been investigated, among others, by Narayan et al. (2000) 
and Lister (2004). 
Section 2 briefly presents the dual-regime utility model (DRUM) associated with our 
definition  of  poverty.  Section  3  proposes  a  test  of  the  model,  based  on  the  analysis  of 
subjective poverty in Italy. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix provides a poverty indicator 
built  on  the  DRUM  framework,  and  proves  its  compliance  with  the  relevant  axiomatic 
requirements as proposed by Cowell (1988) and extended by Tsui (2002) and Bourguignon 
and Chakravarty (2003). 
2. A dual-regime utility model (DRUM) for poverty analyisis 
2.1 The utility-generating process 
Let us assume that there exist m goods in the world, all of which produce utility when 
consumed. The utility function for each individual i is additively separable: 
)) ( , (
1 ki k ki
m
k k i q q v u ϑ ∑ = =               (1)    
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where vk is the subutility function (or good-specific utility function) for the k-th good, 
qki  is the quantity of the k-th good owned by the i-th  individual, and  k ϑ   is a  vector of 
parameters dependent on qki.  
For each good, there exists a quantity zk called a poverty line such that 
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     signifying  that  utility  is  derived  from  each  good  according  to  a  function  that 
exhibits a dual regime, i.e. a function that is differently parametrized depending on whether 
the consumed quantity of that good lies above or below zk. Note that the utility curve for the 
poor is shifted downwards by an intercept lk. 
All fk (and hence all vk) show positive and diminishing returns as described by 
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for all goods k. 
As for continuity, we require    
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for all goods k. We know from (6a-b) that marginal utility  is  negatively correlated with 
consumption for both the poor and the non-poor, consistently with the “absence makes the 
heart  grow  fonder”  idea  of  diminishing  returns;  according  to (9), the  transition  between 
classes is marked by a specific state-switching fall in its level beyond the one predicted in a 
single-regime setting. This fall signals that we are moving from a condition where further 
consumption has the purpose of achieving a decent standard of living to another where it just 
produces additional pleasure. If the magnitude of the cause of consumption can be measured 
by  the  magnitude  of  its  effect, then  the  poverty  lines  zk  are  the  watershed  between  the 
situation of strong need for additional consumption of those who struggle to cope and the 
weak need of those who have already taken care of the basics.  
  Finally, we ask that 
k k k k k k k l z f z f = − ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 ϑ ϑ                (10) 
for all goods k: at the poverty line, the distance between the utility curve for the poor and the 
utility curve for the non-poor is zero. When combined with (8a-8b), this implies that vk is 
also continuous for all k.   
Two  effects  are  at  work  here:  on  the  one  hand,  there  exists  a  penalty  term  lk 
associated with the state of poverty that is positive for all consumption levels below the 
threshold,  representing  the  fact  that  the  poor  incur  a  loss  in  utility  derived  from  being 
outcasts per se. On the other hand, the impact of this loss on utility levels grows smaller as 
the  exit  from  poverty  draws  nearer,  because  it  is  progressively  compensated  by  the 
mechanism described in (9): for any quantity qk, the transformation of consumption into    
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utility yields higher returns in the poverty regime than it would if we applied the non-poverty 
regime. Assumption (10) requires that this compensation be exact at the poverty line. 
The clear-cut separation of these two components is obviously a device that has more 
to do with the economy of the model than with an idea of completely disjoint processes. In 
the real world, what can be observed is that an increase in consumption levels not only 
improves  the  material  conditions  of  the  poor,  it  also  tends  to  alleviate  the  degree  of 
marginalization  and  stigmatization  they  are  subject  to.  In  order  to  describe  the  latter 
phenomenon more accurately, we can define on all qk < zk a function quantifying the net 
moral cost of poverty as 
ck(qk) = ) ) , ( ( ) , ( 1 2 k k k k k k k l q f q f − − ϑ ϑ             (11) 
i.e. the distance between the level of utility that would be achieved by transforming 
qk into utility according to the technology used by the non-poor and the level of utility that is 
actually achieved by those who consume qk, considering that the quantity in point is actually 
below the threshold. From assumptions (5a) through (9) we know that ck is continuous and 
strictly decreasing for all goods k and all quantities qk; it is also zero-valued at the poverty 
line. In other words, the utility gap between the poor and the non-poor starts at a level lk, 
then decreases until it closes at the threshold (Figure 1).   
2.2  Representing different concepts of poverty 
As anticipated in Section 1, the dual-regime utility function described by (1) through 
(5)  can  be  adapted  to  a  number  of  concepts  of  deprivation,  provided  that  the  idea  of 
structurally different states of need is accepted. As far as evaluating which aspects of life are 
important for well-being is concerned, it is easy to see that if m = 1 and the reference good is 
income or final consumption, we have traditional measures of monetary deprivation; if m > 
1, the framework is multidimensional. The relative, absolute, subjective or objective nature 
of  poverty  lines  is  clearly  dependent  on  how  the  value  of  the  parameter(s)  zk  is  set  or 
estimated. The magnitude of the change in need between the poor and the non-poor, and thus 
ultimately  the  emphasis  on  the  problem  of  deprivation,  depends  on  the  value  of  the 
parameters  k ϑ  (or lk, if we start by estimating the cost of poverty instead of deducing it from 
the relationship between different regimes of utility production) and on the functional form    
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of the fks. A situation where poverty is not a problem at all can be re-created by relaxing 
assumption (9) to allow for  2 1 k k ϑ ϑ =  for all k, implying lk = 0 for all k. On the other hand, 
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, implying a high cost of poverty. 
In the multidimensional case, the relative importance of each good in producing utility 
and how it varies depending on the state of poverty is, again, embodied in the value of the 
parameters  k ϑ  (or ck, depending on where the reasoning starts) and the functional form of 
the fks. This part of the empirical specification has the most visible impact on the type of 
consumption patterns predicted by the model under rationality.  
While  the  number  of  dimensions  relevant  to  welfare,  the  nature  of  thresholds 
(absolute or  relative) and the point of view from which they are set (subjective or objective) 
are  normally  decided  beforehand  along  with  the  transformation  rule  that  goes  from 
ownership or consumption to utility (the functional form of the fks), the parameters  k ϑ  can 
be either assumed in order to conduct a poverty assessment based on a normative theory or 
estimated positively. The former exercise assumes the DRUM scenario to be correct, while 
the latter doubles as a test of the model and a way to derive information about the process of 
utility generation from data. In the following, we proceed down the inductive route. 
3.   A test of the model: subjective poverty in Italy  
The abstract nature of the DRUM approach, while ensuring the flexibility discussed 
in Section 2.2, prevents us from building a catch-all experiment able to validate all possible 
adaptations of the framework. When translating the theory into empirics we need to decide 
what utility is, how it can be measured, which goods produce it and in which way. This set 
of choices identifies a specification of our general definition: as a consequence, the test will 
not  tell  us  whether  poverty  as  a  noumenon  exists  or  not,  but  rather  whether,  say,  the 
phenomenon of subjective income poverty does indeed emerge in a given time and location 
in the sense put forward by the paper. Once the reference implementation is chosen, it must 
be ascertained whether there exists, for each of the welfare-generating goods, a threshold    
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able to tell apart two groups of agents with utility functions that are differently parametrized 
consistently with conditions (6a) through (10).  
For the sake of brevity, in this paragraph we will present only one possible test. The 
first dychotomy we are faced with is the following: should we rely on direct elicitation of 
(cardinal) utility, i.e. on self-reported welfare with all the subjectivity biases that such a 
measure entails, or rather embrace the objectivist approach? We choose the former option 
following Frey and Stutzer (2002): “[S]ubjective well-being is a much broader concept than 
decision utility […]. People are reckoned to be the best judges of the overall qualities of their 
lives, and it is a straightforward strategy to ask them about their well-being. […] Measures 
of subjective well-being can thus serve as proxies for ‘utility’”. One appealing alternative 
would  entail  following  the  revealed-preference  path:  (ordinal)  utility  can  be  derived  by 
assuming that agents are rational and allocate income according to an optimization strategy, 
which is reconstructed based on actual choice. A test of the model conducted in this direction 
could prove interesting in two different ways: one, as a means of cross-validating the results 
based on self-assessments of welfare; two, as a means of playing the subjectivist approach 
against the objectivist approach using DRUM as a yardstick. The SHIW data are, however, 
not  ideal  for  this  purpose  because  of  difficulties  in  estimating  the  budget  constraints 
connected with incomplete information on variations in assets during the reference year. 
We  assume  utility  to  arise  from  the  consumption  of  two  goods,  and  we  pick  a 
functional  form  for  the  utility-production  process  described  in  (2)  among  the  simplest 
possible options consistent with conditions (6a) through (8b). A simulation is subsequently 
run: the parameters of the utility function are estimated under different hypotheses on the 
location of the poverty lines. If the features predicted by the theory emerge in the parameter 
estimates for at least one of the pairs of poverty lines fed into the simulation, and if statistical 
tests do not reject the hypothesis of a regime change at these lines, then it makes sense to 
define subjective poverty with respect to each of our two goods as one of two possible states 
of non-satiation, with the characteristics described in Sections 1 and 2. If, on the other hand, 
the parameter estimates are invariant across all partitions established by all poverty lines, or 
if their changes are not statistically significant, then we must conclude that either poverty is 
what we say it is but it does not exist in this particular case, or that the DRUM scenario, and 
especially the definition of poverty at its core, is not valid.     
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3.1 The data  
Every two years, the Bank of Italy carries out a Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth  (SHIW)  on  a  representative  sample  of  about  8,000  Italian  households  with  the 
purpose of gathering information on several aspects of economic life. In 2002, the survey 
included for the first time the following question: 
 
Is your household’s disposable income enough to get you through the end of the month? 
 
- With a great deal of difficulty ....................................................................................... 1 
- With difficulty ............................................................................................................... 2 
- With a little difficulty .................................................................................................... 3 
- Fairly easily.................................................................................................................. 4 
- Easily........................................................................................................................... 5 
- Very easily ...................................................................................................................6 
 
The answer is coded as a multinomial variable taking ordered values 1 through 6. 
Following the principles of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), we believe it 
can  be  considered  a  good  proxy  of  subjective  utility.  Kahneman  (2003)  states  that  
“Perception is reference-dependent: the perceived attributes of a focal stimulus reflect the 
contrast between that stimulus and a context of prior and concurrent stimuli”. In other words, 
people  naturally  evaluate  the  situation  they  are  in  against  a  benchmark:  Stutzer  (2004) 
indicates desires and expectations as natural candidates for this role. As an assessment of the 
stringency of a budget constraint, the answer to the SHIW question measures the ability of 
people to afford the lifestyle they desire; this seems to be an acceptable indicator of well-
being. 
The formulation of the question offers another advantage: it suggests quite precisely 
which variables should be considered as arguments of the utility function, contrary to other 
possible  proxies  such  as  self-reported  happiness.  Since  it  refers  specifically  to  the 
relationship between disposable income and the ability to satisfy a household’s needs, we 
should not expect it to measure the well-being derived from aspects of life, such as health or 
education, that are mentioned in the literature on multidimensional welfare but do not relate 
directly to earnings. This does not necessarily confine us to univariate analysis of income 
utility and, consequently, monetary poverty in the traditional sense. A higher level of insight 
into  the  problem  can  be  attained  by  considering  that  “reaching  the  end  of  the  month” 
comfortably means that income is commensurate to the desired level of consumption, both of    
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vital and leisure goods. We can obtain a bidimensional measure by focusing on how utility is 
derived from the consumption of two aggregate goods, food and non-food commodities.  
Consumption  of  food  at  the  household  level  is  recorded  directly,  by  way  of  the 
following question:  
What is the average monthly figure spent on food? Consider spending on food in supermarkets and the 
like and spending on meals eaten regularly outside the home. 4
 
Consumption of non-food commodities, on the other hand, needs to be estimated as 
the sum of several items that are surveyed independently. A question is asked on the bulk 
value of non-durables bought in a month: food is included, but can easily be subtracted based 
on the information above. We supplement the answer with a measure of yearly expenditure 
on durable goods, which is the object of three separate questions concerning, respectively, 
precious objects, means of transport, and furniture and appliances. Respondents are required 
to  declare  the  value  of  the  goods  acquired  regardless  of  whether  they  were  paid  for 
completely during the reference year.
5 Finally, we also categorize mortgage payments as 
non-food  consumption  expenditure,  even  if  accounting  standards  define  them  as 
saving/investment: they do impact on a household’s budget constraint in a fashion similar to 
rent payments.  
Several other survey variables are featured in our application as controls. They can be 
assumed to influence the subjective evaluation of welfare even if they do not refer directly to 
consumption of utility-producing goods.  These are: the income-to-consumption ratio, which 
is directly related to the idea of tightness of the budget constraint embedded in the question; 
financial  wealth  owned  by  the  household  at  the  end  of  the  reference  year,  which  may 
contribute to a general sense of security and ability to meet unforeseen needs; and a set of 
dummies  referring  to  location  and  demographic  size  of  the  place  of  residence,  home 
                                                         
4 Even though the information on food consumption is not collected with a booklet method, it has been 
shown to be fairly robust. Biancotti, D’Alessio and Neri (2004) estimate the Heise index, a reliability measure 
ranging from 0 (totally unreliable) to 1 (totally reliable) used in statistical literature on data quality, for several 
SHIW variables: food consumption has a score of 0.8.  
5 While in some cases this might distort the evaluation of the income-to-consumption ratio, it serves the 
purpose of our analysis. We want to explain a general level of ease in making ends meet, and households are 
very  likely  to  incorporate  in  the  evaluation  of  their  constraints  the  fact  that  they  have  purchased  a  car, 
regardless of whether they paid for it in a single solution or in instalments: they probably have to cut back on 
other items for a while anyway. 
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ownership,  and  job  status  of  the  head  of  household.  The  location  dummy  reflects  the 
expectation of lower private costs derived from the higher quality and wider availability of 
public goods found in the northern regions of the country; the demographic size dummy is 
supposed to embody the differences in the cost of living between big cities and small towns. 
The information about home ownership and job status is included for the same reason as 
financial wealth.  
3.2 The empirical model 
  Since  food  and  non-food  consumption  are  measured  in  currency,  each  of  the 
aggregate  goods  has  a  unit  price.  The  theoretical  subutility  functions  can  be  written  as 
follows: 
)] ( 1 )[ log( ) ( )] log( [ 2 1 i F i i F i F Fi F F F F L v Ι − + Ι + = α α           (12) 
)] ( 1 )[ log( ) ( )] log( [ 2 1 i NF i i NF i NF NFi NF NF NF NF L v Ι − + Ι + = β β         (13) 
) ( i Ri R f v =                       (14) 
where  F  indicates  consumption  of  food,  NF  indicates  consumption  of  non-food 
commodities, and R 
w ℜ ∈ is a vector of w factors different from current consumption as 
represented in (12) and (13) and contributing to the determination of perceived welfare. We 
assume f  to be linear. 
The individual utility function results from 
Ri NFi Fi i v v v u + + =                      (15) 
Our goal is the estimation of the following model:  
ε φ δ γ β β α α + + + + − + + − + = R D D NF D NF D F D F D u NF F NF NF F F ) log( ) 1 ( ) log( ) log( ) 1 ( ) log( 2 1 2 1   (16) 
where all the variables are vectors in 
n ℜ , except for the matrix of controls R 
w n ℜ × ℜ ∈ ; n 
is the number of individuals in the sample; ε  is white noise, and DF and DNF are two dummy 
variables that take the value 1 when Fi and NFi respectively lie below the given quantities 
F z ˆ  and  NF z ˆ . For the sake of simplicity, we only estimate the initial moral loss connected 
with poverty LF and LNF rather than reconstruct the respective net cost functions. However, 
those can be easily obtained based on the setup of the empirical model and its results. 
A simulation is conducted in order to find poverty lines: the model is estimated for 
190 possible sets of thresholds  F z ˆ  and  NF z ˆ , corresponding to all combinations of a fraction    
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of the median for food consumption and a fraction of the median for non-food consumption. 
Eligible  fractions  for  both  goods  range  from  0.05  to  1  in  increments  of  0.05.  Each 
specification of equation (16) is estimated with a standard ordered probit model (for details 
see, for example, Maddala, 1983); the likelihood is maximized by way of a ridge-stabilized 
Newton-Raphson  algorithm.  Estimates  are  screened  for  compliance  with  the  theoretical 
predictions  as  expressed  by  (5)  and  (9);  if  they  match  the  requirements 
0<α2<α1, 0<β2< β1, γ<0, and δ<0  they are subjected to three statistical tests.
6 First of all, a 
standard likelihood ratio test is run for the hypothesis that a single-regime model, with no 
changes in regression coefficients and no costs of destitution, is nested in the dual-regime 
model. This is done in order to obtain a broad indication that the DRUM framework tells a 
different story  from a standard utility  function; it allows us to consider  jointly  all of  its 
defining traits, namely the switch in parameters and the existence of fixed penalty terms. 
Individual tests for equality of the coefficients above and below the poverty line are then run 
on food and non-food consumption. On account of the use of dummy variables for food and 
non-food poverty in (16) the dataset is partitioned in four cells from the start; in this setting, 
equality tests are equivalent to structural break tests run on points selected ex ante based on a 
model. These tests are not optimal, because the theory is silent on the position of the break 
points and the only requirement that we can posit intuitively is that they should not be above 
the median. A proper structural break test should be run for the empirical model for which 
the  maximum  difference  in  coefficients  is  observed.  To  our  knowledge,  however,  the 
literature does not offer such a procedure for ordered probit estimation, and it is not the goal 
of this paper to propose one; we therefore treat the simulation results much as we would a 
prior probability distribution for the location of breaks.  No joint test is run either; we want 
to look at each different dimension of poverty separately, and the additive utility framework 
allows us to do that without compromising the validity of the test statistics.    
                                                         
6 We do not test for (10) beyond a qualitative assessment of the magnitude of δ and γ, nor do we estimate a 
restricted model, because we expect measurement error in the micro data to prevent the generation of a result 
exactly compliant with such a strict requirement.      
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3.3 Results 
Several  specifications  of  the  dual-regime  model  pass  the  preliminary  screening 
procedures. All of them are characterized by a poverty line for food in the neighbourhood of 
40 per cent of the median per equivalent adult, and a poverty line for non-food commodities 
in the neighbourhood of the median itself. Since the results for these models are very similar, 
which incidentally may give evidence in favour of a fuzzy sets approach to the problem, we 
will  only  discuss  the  case  of  F z ~ =  1,200  euros  (exactly  0.4  times  the  median  for  food 
consumption) and  NF z ~
 = 7,200 euros (exactly the median for non-food consumption). The 
results yielded by ordered probit estimation for this specification of (16) are presented in 
Table 1; Table 2 offers descriptive statistics on income, consumption and poverty incidence, 
organized by level of self-assessed welfare. Figure 2 portrays the two subutility functions. 
The  parameter  values,  together  with  the  chosen  functional  form,  ensure  that 
requirements (6a) through (8b) are complied with; (9) is also heeded, at least at first blush. 
The general likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that the single-regime model is nested 
in the DRUM representation. However, in the case of food the parameter estimate falls by 44 
per cent and the difference is statistically significant; for non-food commodities, the switch 
is negligible in magnitude, the initial utility loss associated with poverty is of the expected 
sign  but  not  significant  and,  more  importantly,  the  p-value  for  a  test of  equality  of  the 
coefficients below and above  NF z ~  is quite high at 0.697. This result is eloquent on the nature 
of poverty as a structurally specific condition of non-satiation; it hints at the fact that two 
different states of being, separated on the basis of consumption levels, can be observed only 
with respect to goods that fuel a minimum ability to survive.
7  
The 3 per cent share of Italian households spending less than 100 euros per adult 
equivalent on food each month appear to perceive the utility of such consumption differently 
from everyone else. In other words, the self-assessment of welfare incorporates the idea that 
life  is  very  different  depending  on  whether  one  has  to  struggle  to  eat  regularly  or  not, 
                                                         
7  The  same  argument  should apply  to  basic  shelter and  clothing.  Unfortunately,  it  is  quite  difficult  to 
estimate the actual consumption of housing services, which might be very different from the rent or mortgage 
paid by a household; and we do not have detailed data concerning expenditure on clothing. 
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signalling the existence of physiological minima and of a common perception thereof.
8 No 
such structural change emerges for non-food commodities: judging from the fact that a weak 
hint at a break can be found around the median, imitation stimuli known in the literature as 
the  “keeping  up  with  the  Joneses”  effect  might  be  predominant  in  this  case.  The  line 
NF z ~ does not separate two qualitatively different states of need, but rather illustrates the fact 
that people might or might not feel a slight variation in the intensity of their wants depending 
on what everyone else has.  
The coefficients on the control variables have the expected sign: self-reported utility 
is affected negatively by living in the South or being unemployed, while living in a small 
town, owning a house and managing to save a good fraction of income improve the situation. 
Financial wealth also seems to have a positive effect, although it is very small.  
It is interesting to note that being self-employed boosts welfare, consistently with 
SHIW-based evidence about income dynamics showing that the self-employed in Italy have 
recently enjoyed income growth rates higher than those of employees (Boeri and Brandolini, 
2005). This result seems to support a particular facet of the idea, recalled in Section 3.1, that 
subjective judgements about well-being tend to include a relative element; in this case we are 
looking  at  interpersonal  comparisons  rather  than  at  consistency  between  desires  and 
achievements. The position of a household in the distribution of income has an effect on 
reported utility that goes above and beyond the mere increase in consumption and/or savings, 
because people evaluate their own conditions with reference to the prevailing community 
standards (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Easterlin, 2002). 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper offers a micro-founded general definition of poverty set in the context of 
utility theory. Poverty and non-poverty are described as two structurally different types of 
local  non-satiation:  the  former  entails  a  strong  need  for  further  consumption  and  social 
                                                         
8  Famine  is an  unknown  phenomenon in  Italy,  barring rare  and  extreme  situations  experienced  by  the 
homeless or by illegal immigrants, who would not appear in our regressions anyway as they are not part of the 
SHIW  reference  population.  Such  a  low  level  of  expenditure,  however,  can  not  grant  proper  nutrition. 
Probably, it is also associated with very strong uncertainty about the possibility of having a meal on the table 
every day. 
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marginalization,  the  latter  is  characterized  by  a  weak  need  for  further  consumption  and 
satisfactory adjustment to social expectations. Each of the states can be fully described by a 
separate technology of utility production: a poverty line is defined as a quantity of a good for 
which there is a structural break in how utility is extracted from consumption of that good.  
  The  model  is  tested  on  data  from  the  Survey  of  Household  Income  and  Wealth 
conducted by the Bank of Italy. We look at how self-assessed welfare, or perceived utility, 
relates  to  consumption  of  food  and  non-food  commodities.  The  main  predictions  of  the 
model are confirmed for food consumption: a threshold can be found such that two different 
technologies of utility production are observed,  and  it corresponds to 40 per cent of the 
median, probably signalling physiological minima. The parameter governing marginal utility 
falls by 44 per cent at this threshold. For non-food commodities, no significant change of 
regimes is found. Subjective welfare, where non-food commodities are concerned, appears to 
be connected with needs that are less exposed to structural change, possibly because they are 
not as urgent or objective as the food-related ones. 
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SUBJECTIVE UTILITY FUNCTION, ITALY, 2002 
(ordered probit model) 
 
 
  Estimate  Standard 
error  P-value 
Log of food consumption: below the poverty line (α1)  0.913  0.247  0.000 
Log of food consumption: above the poverty line (α2)  0.511  0.032  0.000 
Log of non-food consumption: below the poverty line (β1)  0.861  0.049  0.000 
Log of non-food consumption: above the poverty line (β2)  0.836  0.047  0.000 
Intangible costs of poverty: food  (γ)  -2.415  1.263  0.091 
Intangible costs of poverty: non-food  (δ)  -0.267  0.571  0.641 
Income to consumption ratio  0.593  0.019  0.000 
Financial wealth  0.001  0.000  0.000 
                     Dummies       
Southern Italy   -0.171  0.029  0.000 
Self-employed  0.218  0.042  0.000 
Not in the labor force/unemployed  -0.063  0.027  0.019 
Home ownership  0.130  0.028  0.000 
Population of town of residence: 20,000 to 40,000  -0.053  0.036  0.142 
Population of town of residence: 40,000 to 500,000  -0.095  0.029  0.001 
Population of town of residence: above 500,000  -0.162  0.048  0.001 
                  Ordinal response cut-offs       
1  10.869  0.498   
2  11.554  0.499   
3  12.625  0.501   
4  13.961  0.504   
5  15.032  0.508   
P-value for the likelihood ratio test: single-regime nested in 
dual-regime 
0.018 
Dual-regime model: p-value for α1=α2  0.047 
Dual-regime model: p-value for β1=β2  0.697 
Pseudo-R
2  0.123    




Table 1 (continued) 
 
Pearson correlation statistics 
for regressors and associated 
p-values 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 















Non-food consumption (2)    1.000
0 
0.476  -0.173  -0.292  0.134  0.103 












Financial wealth (3)      1.000  0.139  -0.151  0.329  0.032 












      1.000  -0.054  0.124  0.004 






Residence in southern  
Italy (5) 
        1.000  -0.023  -0.056 




Home ownership (6)            1.000  -0.114 
              <.000
1 
Population of  
town of residence (7) 
            1.000 
              <.000
1   
The dependent variable is the six-level subjective evaluation of utility described in Section 
3. Variables are per equivalent adult where applicable; the standard OECD equivalence 
scale was employed (head of household=1, other household members older than 14=0.5, 
household  members  younger  than  14=0.3).  Dummy  variables  for  home  ownership  and 
residence in Southern Italy are at the household level, while dummy variables for job status 
refer to the head of household, i.e. the main contributor to household expenses. The poverty 
line used for food consumption is of 1,200 euro per year (2002 prices), corresponding to 40 
per  cent  of  the  weighted  median;  for  non-food consumption,  it  is  of  7,200  euro  (2002 
prices), corresponding to the weighted median. The baseline for the employment dummy is 
“Employee”.  The  baseline  for  the  demographic  size  dummy  is  “Population  of  town  of 
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Table 2 
INCOME, CONSUMPTION AND POVERTY STATISTICS BY  
LEVEL OF SELF-REPORTED WELFARE, ITALY, 2002 
(euros per equivalent adult per year, percentages*) 
 
 
Food consumption  Non-food consumption  Income  Self-
reported 
welfare  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
1 (Lowest)  2,370.32  2,400.00  4,966.43  4,285.71  8,132.38  7,405.41 
2  2,827.74  2,640.00  6,474.08  5,600.00  10,805.07  9,992.12 
3  3,099.11  3,000.00  7,649.62  6,580.65  13,896.61  12,843.76 
4  3,618.17  3,360.00  10,369.82  8,824.76  19,584.81  17,887.36 
5  3,873.89  3,600.00  13,972.28  11,803.23  26,956.45  23,194.61 
6 (Highest)  4,464.24  3,840.00  18,490.64  14,300.00  38,388.15  30,884.51 
All  3,216.77  3,000.00  8,723.14  7,200.00  16,051.72  13,958.40 
 
Distance from  
poverty line: food  
Distance from poverty 
line: non-food   Poverty incidence  Self-
reported 
welfare  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Food  Non-food 
1 (Lowest)  1,170.32  1,200.00  -1,985.95  -2,666.67  0.09  0.81 
2  1,627.74  1,440.00  -478.30  -1,352.38  0.04  0.66 
3  1,899.11  1,800.00  697.23  -371.74  0.02  0.55 
4  2,418.17  2,160.00  3,417.44  1,872.38  0.01  0.30 
5  2,673.89  2,400.00  7,019.90  4,850.84  0.02  0.21 
6 (Highest)  3,264.24  2,640.00  11,538.26  7,347.62  0.01  0.10 
All  2,016.77  1,800.00  1,770.76  247.62  0.03  0.49 
*See Table 1 for details about the equivalence scale and the poverty lines employed in the 
calculations. 
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Figure 1 
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Technical Appendix 
 
  A.1    A poverty indicator for the dual-regime utility model 
Once  utility  is  evaluated  for  each  individual,  a  way  to  measure  poverty  must  be 
found. The primary problem consists in identifying the destitute (Sen, 1976); then we have 
to  devise  an  indicator  of  personal  deprivation,  and  finally  we  need  to  decide  how  to 
compound the individual figures in order to quantify how poor a community is.  
With respect to the former issue, we adopt the so-called union approach (Atkinson, 
2003): someone is poor, in the sense that their conditions are directly relevant to the value of 
our measure, if they fail to reach the threshold for at least one commodity. This choice seems 
to be better suited to the idea of additively separable utility, i.e. of distinct, non-interacting 
states of need and independent contributions of specific aspects of life to the overall level of 
welfare, than the intersection approach, according to which only people who fall below all 
poverty lines should be considered poor.  
As for the form of the indicator, the basic idea is quite straightforward: poverty may 
be measured in terms of distance from the thresholds that divide the poor from the non-poor, 
taking into account the different relevance of each good in determining welfare. As a metric, 
we  can  use  distance  in  utilities:  in  other  words,  we  propose  a  generalized,  utility-based 
version of the poverty gap. While it is not the only possible choice consistent with the dual-
regime utility framework, it has the advantage of symmetry with a well-known and often 
used monetary measure. In particular, we define the individual poverty level as  
∑
=
Ι − − =
m
k
ki k k k ki k k k k i q l q f z f p
1
1 2 ) ( )] ) , ( ( ) , ( [ ϑ ϑ                   (1.A) 
i.e.  the  sum  over  all  goods  of  differences  between  the  utility  enjoyed  from  the 
consumption of a good at the poverty line,  ) , ( 2 k k k z f ϑ , and the actual utility derived from 
good k by individual i, who is below the poverty line; the presence of Ik ensures that pi is 
zero-valued  only  in  the  case  of  agents  not  falling  short of  any  threshold.  Note that the 
indicator does not necessarily attain higher values for those who are poor in a larger number 
of dimensions: it all depends on the form of the fks, and how they are parametrized.     
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  The aggregation strategy is the simplest possible. We propose a simple average of 










1                                  (2.A) 
where n is the demographic dimension of the sample we are studying. While this might 
not seem consistent with the spirit of not wanting to adhere to any specific a priori, it is 
necessary that we choose an assumption, and the trivial one of invariant weights seems to be 
as non-judgemental as possible.
 9 
A.2    Proof  of  compliance  of  the  indicator  with  axiomatic  requirements  for 
multidimensional poverty measures  
Let    D  =  {d1,d2…dn}  be  a  set  of  n  individuals,  corresponding  to  our  reference 
population. Let K= {k1,k2…km} be a set of m attributes that we consider important for well-
being. We define a matrix Q
m n ℜ × ℜ ∈  whose elements qdk correspond to the quantity of 
attribute  k  ∈  K  owned  by  individual  d∈D.  Each  row  is  therefore  a  vector  qd 
m ℜ ∈ of 
quantities of each attribute owned by individual d, while each column is a vector qk 
n ℜ ∈ of 
quantities of attribute k owned by each individual. We also define a vector z 
m ℜ ∈ as the 
collection of poverty lines for each of the attributes.  
Let I
m n ℜ × ℜ ∈ be a matrix of poverty dummies, where element idk corresponds to the 
value that the indicator function (3) has for individual d and attribute k. It is easily seen that 
the vector of column sums for I contains poverty headcounts for each of the m attributes, 
while the vector of row sums contains an indicator that tells us in how many dimensions the 
individual d is poor.  
Let ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ1
m ℜ ∈  be the vector of parameters that transform attribute levels into utility 
levels for the poor with respect to each good, and ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ2
m ℜ ∈ the same for the non-poor. 
                                                         
9 Different choices lead to placement of greater emphasis on specific groups, such as the very poor, the working poor 
and so on. The dual-regime utility framework can be applied irrespective of how one chooses to construct the measure in 
(1.A).     
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We define the two matrices Θ Θ Θ Θ1 1 1 1        = ℜ × ℜ ∈
m n ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ1
’n and Θ Θ Θ Θ2 2 2 2        = ℜ × ℜ ∈
m n ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ2
’n, where the 
superscript n indicates an n-fold replication of a vector or matrix; in other words, all rows of 
Θ Θ Θ Θ1 1 1 1 are identical and correspond to ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ1
’, while all rows of Θ Θ Θ Θ2 2 2 2 are identical and correspond to 
ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ2
’. 
The matrix Θ  Θ  Θ  Θ  = ℜ × ℜ ∈
m n (IoΘ Θ Θ Θ1 1 1 1) + [(1 1 1 1nxm−I)o Θ Θ Θ Θ2 2 2 2], where 1 1 1 1nxm 
m n ℜ × ℜ ∈ is the unit 
matrix conformable for summation with I and the symbol  o refers to the Hadamard product 
operator,
10 is such that element  ϑdk  indicates the parameter used to transform the quantity of 
attribute k owned by individual d into utility, according to his state of poverty with respect to 
that good. Each row gives the vector of parameters corresponding to each individual. 
We can define the felicity matrix V = ℜ × ℜ ∈
m n  F (Q,Θ Θ Θ Θ) + Ic, where F is a matrix 
function F: 
m n m n ℜ × ℜ → ℜ × ℜ , evaluated elementwise, and c 
m ℜ ∈  is the vector of good-
specific costs of poverty. Each element vdk indicates the utility level yielded by good k  for 
individual d. While the vector of individual utilities is simply u
n ℜ ∈  = V
.1m, where 1m 
m ℜ ∈ is the unit vector of m elements, the vector of individual poverty measures is p 
n ℜ ∈ = 
G [ Io (V – F (Z, Θ Θ Θ Θ2 2 2 2))]1m, where G is a matrix function G: 
m n m n ℜ × ℜ → ℜ × ℜ , evaluated 
element-wise, and Z  = ℜ × ℜ ∈
m n  z
’n.  
The poverty measure P can therefore be obtained as a scalar function P of the vector 
p, P:  ℜ → ℜ
n ; indirectly, it can be represented as a scalar function of the attribute matrix 
and the vector of poverty lines H (Q,z), allowing us to prove its compliance with axioms for 
poverty measures, as formally enunciated in Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003). We will 
discuss the multidimensional case for generality purposes. 
Axiom 1: Strong focus. For any attribute matrix Q and any threshold vector z, and for 
any attribute matrix M such that for an individual d and attribute k, mdk > qdk > zk, if 
(i)  mek = qek  for all e ≠ d 
(ii)  mdh = qdh for all h ≠ k 
                                                         
10 The Hadamard product of two nxm matrices A and B is an nxm matrix C such that cij=aijbij. 
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then P(M,z) = P(Q,z). This equates to stating that changes in the level of any attribute 
owned by an individual who is not poor with respect to that attribute do not change the value 
of the poverty measure P. It applies to P in (2.A) as a direct consequence of the presence of 
the indicator term in (1.A): utility generated by attributes with respect to which one is not 
poor does not enter the evaluation of individual (and therefore aggregate) poverty at all; its 
changes do not, either. If the strong focus axiom is satisfied, then the weak focus axiom, 
stating that changes in attributes owned by persons that are not poor in any dimension do not 
affect  the  poverty  measure,  is  satisfied  as  well.  The  weak  focus  axiom  is  conceptually 
different  from  the  strong  focus  one  because  it  allows  the  poverty  measure  to  decrease 
(increase) if someone who is poor in one or more dimensions consumes more (less) of a 
good with respect to which he/she is not poor. Given our interpretation of poverty as a sum 
of good-specific distinct states of need, each of which has a meaning in its own right, we 
choose the strong version. 
Axiom 2: Monotonicity. For any attribute matrices Q and M and any threshold vector 
z, if M is derived from Q by increasing the level owned of an attribute for a person who is 
poor  with  respect  to  that  attribute  then  P(M,z)  ≤  P(Q,z).  It  applies  to  P  in  (2.A)  as  a 
consequence of positive marginal utility in (5a) if the increase of the level owned does not go 
beyond the poverty line; otherwise, it applies because one of the terms in the summation for 
(1.A) disappears; since all the terms must be greater than zero for (8), the value of (1.A) and 
hence (2.A) will be lower.  
Axiom  3:  Symmetry.  For  any  attribute  matrix  Q,  any  threshold  vector  z  and  any 
permutation  matrix  Π Π Π Π 
m n ℜ × ℜ ∈ ,  P(Π Π Π ΠQ,z)  =  P(Q,z).  Since  (1.A)  is  computed  from 
individual poverty levels as described in (2.A), permutation of rows has no effect; since 
utility is additively separable, permutation of columns has no effect. In both cases, we are 
just permuting elements of a sum. 
Axiom 4: Subgroup consistency.  For any attribute matrix Q 
m n ℜ × ℜ ∈ partitioned 
into t matrices Q1, Q2… Qt of column dimension m and row dimension n1, n2…nt and for 








 P(Qs,z). This is especially relevant for policy-making 
purposes: poverty must be easily traced back to different social groups in order to select    
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relief programme targets. The property is ensured by the fact that (2.A) is a simple average 
of individual poverty indicators. 
Axiom 5: Continuity. For any threshold vector z, P(Q,z) is continuous on 
m n ℜ × ℜ . 
This holds because P is a sum of the individual pis, which are are continuous; for any  good k 
and qki < > zk  this is ensured respectively by the fact that pi is a distance between two vectors 
below the threshold, and constant at zero above.  The function is also continuous at qki = zk: 
0 lim ) ) , ( ( ) , ( lim 1 2 = = − −
+ − →  → 
ki
z q
k k ki k k k k
z q
p l q f z f
k k
ϑ ϑ  for any good k due to (8) and (7a). 
Axiom 6: Replication invariance.  For any attribute matrix Q, any threshold vector z 
and any scalar r, P(Q
r,z) = P(Q,z), where Q
r is the r-fold replication of Q. This ensures that 
the value of P does not depend on population size, and it is ensured by the fact that (2.A) is a 
simple average of individual poverty indicators. Note that this is only a very basic set of 
axioms,  constructed  to  ward  off  macroscopic  problems  such  as  excessive  influence  of 
measurement error on poverty indicators, results that depend on the demographic size of a 
country, and assessments of destitution that incorporate the evaluation of how the non-poor 
live to a greater extent than the possible adoption of a relative poverty line. They are valid 
for (2.A) no matter the parametrization of the problem. 
 
Further requirements of a distributional nature are often imposed on poverty measures. 
While the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, stating that poverty cannot increase (decrease) if 
there  is  a  progressive  (regressive)  transfer  of  resources  between  the  poor,  holds  in  the 
general  formulation  as  well  as  for  each  single  good,  subtler  properties  such  as  the 
multidimensional transfer principle, scale invariance, translation invariance, non-decreasing 
poverty  under  correlation  increasing  rearrangement  all  depend  on  the  specific  choice  of 
functional forms and parameters.    
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